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Torts and Choice of Law:
Searching for Principles
Keith N. Hylton

Introduction
If a tortious act (e.g., negligently firing a rifle) occurs in state X and the
harm (e.g., killing a bystander) occurs in state Y, which state's law should
apply? This is a simple example of the choice of law problem in torts. The
problem arises between states or provinces with different laws within one
nation and between different nations. In this article I discuss this problem
largely in terms of incentive effects and also consider where this topic might
be addressed in a torts course.'
Choice of law is a complicated area and I will not attempt to provide
a detailed account here. The approaches fall into several categories: law of
place of harm (lex loci delicti commissi), law of place of conduct, law of forum
(lexfon), and other tests that attempt to balance various interests.2 In this latter category is the "significant relationship" test of the Second Restatement,
which applies the law of the state which has the most significant relationship
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On the economics of choice of law, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 64546 ( 5th ed., New York, i998); Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis
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to the occurrence and the parties.3 Also in this category is the "proper law"
test that looks to the law that has the greatest relevance to the issues involved
in the dispute.4
The approaches can be put into four categories: law of forum, law of injury
site, law of decision site, and balancing tests.
The law of decision site refers to the state in which the tortfeasor made the
decision to commit the tort. This approach is not explicitly offered in most of
the treatments of choice of law, but it is suggested by some of the analyses of
specific examples. The balancing tests category includes the significant relationship test of the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Law, the proper law
test, and any other test that involves balancing the different interests at stake.
The traditional approach starts with lex loci and considers the site of
conduct (which could be distinguished from site of decision) when there
is no clear relevance to the site of injury-e.g., the injury could have happened anywhere or it is not clear where the site of the injury is.5 Consider
for example, a tort suit for interference with a marriage relationship. The
adulterous act takes place in state X, and the faithful (injured) spouse lives
in state r. The site of the conduct is state X, while the site in which the injury
is perceived is state Y The traditional approach substitutes the law of state
X in this case. 6 Another illustration is a tort suit for unfair competition. The
unfair competition could take place in state X, while the injury could occur
instate I.
The most widely accepted modern approach starts with the traditional focus
on lex loci and deviates according to the significant relationship test of the
Second Restatement.7 To return to the marital infidelity example, the modern
approach starts with the site of the injury as the default option, and then asks
whether there is an alternative site that has a more significant relationship with
the occurrence and the parties.
As this brief description suggests, lex loci remains alive and well in spite of
the modern extensions and modifications. It is also the default rule in international conflict of laws settings. The discussion below examines the incentive
arguments supporting or contradicting the traditional approach. I find that the
3.

Id. at

4.

Id. at 725-31.

5.

This is probably an overly broad statement of the exception. However, the exceptions that
had developed under lex loci seem to have this general feature in common-i.e., that the site
of the injury seemed to bear no obvious relationship to the site of the conduct. See Scoles,
et al., Conflict of Laws, supra note 2, at 692-95 (discussing exceptions in cases of defamation,
invasion of privacy, unfair competition, fraud, and several others).

6.

Id. at 693; Albert v. McGrath, 278 F2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 196o).
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Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws §§ 45-78 (1971). Before the Restatement
(Second), Brainerd Currie's critique of lex loci encouraged many courts to rethink conflicts issues. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 Duke L.J. 171.
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incentive arguments generally support the traditional approach. I conclude that
a zone offoreseeable impact rule provides the best underlying principle, or default
rule, in conflict of law situations.
Theory and Applications
Since I find the tests largely uninformative in the absence of specific

examples, let us consider two. Both of the examples below have two
versions.
Example i
A accidentally shoots B with his hunting rifle. A is in state Xand B is in state
Y.B brings suit in state Z. Which state's law should apply, that of state X (site
of decision and conduct), state r(lex loci), or state Z (lex fori)?
Version i of Example i
Suppose state X holds that hunters have no duty to avoid negligently
injuring bystanders and state rapplies the negligence rule to hunting accidents. This difference in law might arise because of differences in local
conditions. Suppose, for example, the deer in state Xare unusually dangerous (e.g., spreading a fatal type of Lyme disease), so that there is a great
public benefit from killing them. Under these conditions, courts in state
X might excuse negligent shootings of bystanders and hold hunters liable
only when they acted recklessly.
Since there is no duty to take care while hunting deer in state X, hunters
in state X will not take care to avoid injuring bystanders. If the law of state X
applies to hunting accidents in which the bullet travels from state X to state Y,
hunters in state Xwill not take care to avoid injuring bystanders in state Y.
If we assume that the legal rules in each state provide the most desirable
level of deterrence within that state, the fact that hunters in state Xdo not take
care to avoid injuring within-state bystanders provides no basis for rejecting
state X's law. However, when hunters in state X shoot bystanders in state Y,
they are imposing costs onto state , while providing no potentially offsetting
benefit to state Y.Assuming that state Y's law is best (optimal) within its borders, these costs are likely to be excessive from a social perspective. State Y's
law should be applied to correct this problem.'
This simple example supports the lex loci rule, and suggests that the
underlying principle imposes liability based on the zone of foreseeable impact. Put another way, the lex loci rule reflects the following principle: if
the potential tortfeasor can foresee the zone of impact, or equivalently the
place in which the victim will be harmed, the law of that zone applies to the
tortfeasor's conduct. This principle also suggests that if the tortfeasor cannot
8.

Suppose the hypothetical is reversed, so that the gunfire goes from state r into state X.
Since state X has an interest in shooting deer, there is an offsetting benefit, which justifies
application of the no-duty rule.
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foresee the zone of impact, the law of the place in which the tortfeasor
committed the tort should apply since there are no other reasonable options. In this example, if the tortfeasor cannot foresee that his conduct
would injure a bystander in state Y, state X's law should apply.
One could offer a moral basis for the zone of foreseeable impact principle.
People should be encouraged to rely on the laws that apply to them. The
argument is similar to that of Vaughan v. Menlove,9 where the court held that
an objective standard applied to torts, largely because an objective standard
permits potential victims to rely on the assumption that the potential injurer
would comply with that standard. However, the exception to the zone of foreseeable impact rule-that the law of the place of conduct applies if the zone
of impact is not foreseeable-suggests that the moral argument is not entirely
predictive of the underlying principle.
Version

2

of Example i

Suppose that state X applies the negligence rule to shootings and state Y
applies the strict liability rule. Although the alternative legal rules are easily
stated, this example turns out to be considerably more complicated than the
previous one. It requires us to take a closer look at deterrence analysis. The
literature has distinguished care level and activity level effects.
Care Level Effects
By care level, I refer to the instantaneous level of precaution that an actor
adopts when engaged in some activity. For example, one takes more or less
care while driving by regulating the speed or looking frequently for pedestrians in the road. By activity level, I refer to the extent to which one engages in
an activity. For example, the activity level of driving is increased by choosing
to drive more.
One basic proposition from the deterrence theory literature is that negligence
and strict liability have equivalent effects on care levels, while only strict liability
affects activity levels.'o Suppose there is a negligence rule, and the actor chooses
not to comply with it because the cost of compliance, $2, is greater than the
harm that would result from his failure to comply, $i.Given these numbers he
would not be held liable under the negligence rule (as described by the Hand
formula)." Suppose the rule is switched to strict liability. Will the actor take
more care? No. The cost of compliance is $2 while the additional liability is $i.

9.

132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).

io.

See, e.g., Steven M. Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 Journal of Legal Stud.
(8o).

ii.

According to the Hand formula, an actor is negligent if he fails to take care when the burden
of taking care is less than the incremental harm that results from failing to take care. See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 E2d 169 (2d. Cir. 1947).
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He will not choose to spend $2 to avoid a liability charge of $i. This implies that
we will observe the same care levels under both strict liability and negligence."
There is a different result for activity levels. Under the negligence rule,
the actor will not be held liable if the incremental cost of care exceeds the
incremental harm. Under strict liability, the actor will be held liable in this
case. This implies that actors who are engaged in activities that expose
them to liability for injuries to others will bear higher costs under strict
liability than under negligence, even though both are exercising the same
level of care. Because activity costs are higher under strict liability than
under negligence, activity levels will be lower under strict liability than
under negligence.
Recall that state rhas a strict liability rule and state X has a negligence
rule. With respect to deterring careless conduct, we know that, to a first
approximation, the rules in states X and rhave the same effect. We must
consider activity level effects to choose between these rules.
Activity Level Effects
Now we have to take a few steps back from the problem. Why would state X
(the shooter's state) choose to adopt a negligence rule and state Y(the victim's
state) a strict liability rule. If one state has adopted a socially desirable or optimal rule while the other has adopted a socially undesirable or suboptimal rule,
there is no reason to prefer the suboptimal law. The choice of law problem becomes simple under this assumption. Suppose, though, the rules are optimal
given the conditions in each state.' 3
Why might a strict liability rule be optimal in state rwhile a negligence
rule is optimal in state X? The most likely answer is that the activity falling
under the rule has a higher benefit-cost ratio in state X than in state Y.4 For
that reason, state X does not perceive a great need to discourage the activity,
in comparison to state 2s perception. In particular, if the ratio of externalized
benefits to externalized costs is higher in state X than in state , it may be optimal for state X to adopt a negligence rule for shooting accidents while state
radopts a strict liability rule.'5 Indeed, if we assume that the benefit-cost ratio

12.

This basic equivalence proposition does not necessarily hold if we take other factors such
as litigation costs and uncertainty into account. However, it would complicate matters too
greatly to do so, and the thought exercise usually conducted as the first effort to understand
incentive effects is to imagine the rules working in a "frictionless" world of zero costs and
perfect certainty.

13.

As Posner notes, this immediately implies an advantage for the lex loci approach because
the home state is likely to have an advantage in determining optimal rules in light of local
conditions, see Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law, supra note i, at 646. For an earlier
article noting the state's advantage in determining the best law given local conditions, see
William F Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. ( z963).

14.

Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 9o Nw. U. L. Rev. 977 (996)

15.
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•
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is unusually high in state X, it may be optimal for state X to adopt a no-duty
rule, as in the first example.
Suppose state Xhas a larger population of hunters than state Y.Hunting
offers a few benefits to the general public. Suppose, for example, hunters reduce the deer population in state X, which reduces the population
of deer predators (wolves, coyotes) and the harms caused by an excessive
deer population (Lyme disease). The general public in state Xbenefits from
reductions in the population of deer predators, because the animals that
hunt deer fawn might take an interest in hunting small children as well.
The public also benefits from reducing the incidence of Lyme disease. On
the other hand, hunting also externalizes costs to the general public (e.g.,
accidental shootings of people).
Conditions are different in state YC The deer population is minuscule so
the external benefits of hunting are trivial. On the other hand, criminal activity is more rampant and the guns hunters carry often get used for criminal
purposes. Thus, in state Y,the externalized costs of the activity of shooting
rifles is relatively high.
Given these assumptions, lex loci is the best rule on incentive grounds. The
rule has to be evaluated in terms of its activity level effects, since we have already established that the care level effects of the two rules are equivalent. Lex
loci deters the general activity of shooting from state X to state ,which is desirable given the assumptions. Shooting from state Xinto state rdoes nothing
to help cull the deer population in state X and only imposes costs on people
in state Y; hence it is desirable to reduce the activity of shooting from state X
into state Y.Also, lex loci does not alter incentives within state X (victim and
shooter both in X) or within state .
Suppose we use the law of the place of the conduct, the law of state
X. Under this approach, we observe undesirable incentives. The activity
of shooting from state X into state r would be carried on at a socially
excessive scale. In addition, shooters have an incentive to leave state Ito
stand in state X and shoot into state rC This is the activity level effect that
would result from using the law of the state of conduct in this example.

Since shifting activity from just within the border of state r to just within
the border of state X imposes costs without offsetting benefits, the change
would be undesirable.
The general proposition implied by this example is that when the liability
rule affects only activity levels, lex loci is the best choice of law rule. It avoids
giving incentives to actors to shift their activities in a way that imposes new
costs on society. It follows from this that the law of the forum state is not an
attractive option on incentive grounds.
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Example 2
This example is based roughly on Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll.'6
The train starts in state X and the injury occurs in state Y. An employee of
the railroad is injured as the result of a fellow employee's negligence. The fellow-servant rule applies in state r.7 State X holds railroads vicariously liable
even when an employee is injured by the negligence of a fellow employee. The
employee loses his suit against the railroad if the law of state rapplies, and he
wins if the law of state X applies.
Consider the following two versions of this case. Version i: The negligent
act of the fellow employee occurs in state .Version 2: The negligent act of the
fellow employee occurs in state X.
Version i of Example 2
Under Version i, the negligent act and the injury both occur in state r
Which state's law should apply, state X (negligence) or state r (fellow-servant)? If the railroad has not been negligent in any way in training and monitoring the employee who caused the injury, then requiring compensation will
do nothing to encourage precaution on the part of railroads. Compensating
the injured employee, under this scenario, is equivalent to taxing the railroad's
activity. This would be desirable to state ronly if it (or the courts of the state)
perceived a need to reduce the activity levels of railroads operating in state Y.
However, state Y's decision to adopt the fellow-servant rule is an indication
that it perceives no need to impose an additional tax on the provision of rail
service within the state. It follows that there is no basis, in incentive concerns,
for deviating from the lex loci rule. The only gain from deviating would be the
compensation paid to the injured employee, but that is just a transfer, under
the assumption of this hypothetical, from the railroad to the employee, serving
no beneficial effect on the allocation of resources.
Version 2 of Example 2
Now consider Version 2, where the negligent act occurs in state X and the
injury in state r.In this case, the lex loci rule could have undesirable incentive effects. If the law that applies in state X (vicarious liability) provides the
right level of deterrence, as assumed, applying lex loci in this example introduces an exception that could weaken the state's law. First, applying lex loci
allows the firm to escape paying damages for negligent acts of employees that
result in injuries to fellow employees in state r.In addition, the rule would
give the domestic railroad an incentive to move its activity to just outside of
the boundary of state r, to evade the regulatory effect of the negligence law.
Second, if state X's adoption of this version of vicarious liability (recall that it
16.

11So. 803 (1892).

17.

Under the fellow-servant rule, an employer is not liable to employee C for injuries caused
by the negligence of fellow employee D, unless the employer was negligent in hiring D or in
monitoring employees. Farwell v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
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applies even when the injury to an employee is caused by a fellow employee)
reflected a desire to impose an additional tax on the activity of railroads, perhaps because state X perceives rail service as an activity with high social costs,
applying lex loci undermines the state's effort to discourage the provision of
rail service within its borders. Given this, the law of state Xis preferable to that
of state Y
Version 2 of Example 2 can be altered so that state Yhas the vicarious
liability rule and state X has the fellow-servant rule. Applying lex loci has
the effect of taxing the activity of railroads in a manner that state rclearly
does not perceive as socially desirable, given its law.
This example supports carving an exception to the rigid form of lex loci,
which would permit a deviation from the law of the injury state when the site
of the injury is more or less random. Special exceptions that had developed
under the lex loci rule incorporate such an exception, and modern balancing
tests incorporate it explicitly. In the second version of the hypothetical, the site
of the injury is unrelated to the decision that leads to the injury. Imposing the
law of the decision state avoids weakening incentives for care, or incentives to
reduce an activity, created by that state's law.
One could apply the significant relationship test to this example, to reach
the same conclusions. The significant relationship test begins with lex loci as
the default option and then asks whether it makes sense to adopt the law of the
state with the more significant relationship to the parties and the accident. The
foregoing argument could be used, within the framework of the significant
relationship test, to reach the conclusion that state X's law is the better choice
in Version 2 of Example 2.
This is a good place to return to the zone of foreseeable impact rule. The
traditional approach under lex loci seems now to be entirely consistent with
the zone of foreseeable impact test mentioned earlier. The lex loci rule deviates, in several cases, from the law of the injury site when that site is incidental.
This is consistent with a foreseeable impact approach because such an approach would presumably deviate from the zone of impact when that zone is
not foreseeable.
One question that the legal tests do not appear to address is what should
be done when the site of the decision to commit a tort differs from the site of
the conduct, both of which may differ from the site of the injury. Return to the
example of interference with a marriage relationship. The adulterous parties
may have entered into an agreement to commit adultery in state Z, agreeing
to commit the act in state X, injuring one party's spouse in state rC Under the
view that the site of the injury is more or less incidental, the traditional law
would look to the site of the conduct, state X. But in this hypothetical, state
X may be more or less incidental too. This would suggest that the law of state
Z, the state of the decision, should take effect. The difficulty with this solution

is that there are instances in which the state of the decision, especially one
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involving a conspiracy, cannot be determined. The state of the conduct may
be the only identifiable option in many instances.
Integrating Choice of Law into the Torts Course
How is all this connected to the basic torts course? One could view this
material as related to the reasonable person standard and the determination of
negligence-cases such as Vaughan v. Menlove, or Stone v. Bolton." Vaughan v. Menlove
shows that tort law adopts an objective rather than subjective standard. The
choice of law question leads us to consider which objective standard among
several should be applied, when several are available.
Just as Vaughan v. Menlove leads to a discussion of the reasonableness of
relying on a certain objective care level taken by others, the choice of law
problems takes us into reliance questions. A decision to apply the law of
one state rather than another involves some implicit view that a certain
standard of reliance is preferable to alternatives. Lex loci, coupled with
Vaughan v. Menlove, says that people should be entitled to rely on the objective (perhaps average) standard of conduct determined by the law of the
site of the injury.
As I noted earlier, lex loci can be defended on the same grounds as the
decision in Vaughan v. Menlove. Vaughan v. Menlove makes sense, one can argue,
because potential victims of tortfeasors should not have to guess whether the
tortfeasor is or is not capable of meeting the average level of care adopted
by reasonable and conscientious agents. The lex loci rule says in effect that
potential victims of tortfeasors should not have to guess whether the tortfeasor comes from another state which may apply an entirely different standard
to the conduct leading to the injury.
However, lex loci does not always adhere to the principle that the law of the
place of the injury governs. Courts make exceptions when the place of the injury is incidental or happenstance. This exception is hard to reconcile with the
reliance argument that appears to support the decision in Vaughan v. Menlove.
Since the deterrence analysis in this article goes into questions of activity
level effects and easily applies to transboundary pollution problems, the choice
of law problem may fit better if covered in a course after the material on strict
liability, specifically the nuisance and ultrahazardous activity cases.
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